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THE POLITICS OF JUDGING:
SECTION 1 OF THE CHARTER OF
RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS
By PAMELA A. CHAPMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
As a guide to decision, 'be nice to poor people' is better than 'kick the cat,' but
it does not really pour substantive moral content into constitutional law.'
It has been five years since Canada embarked upon the "grand
constitutional adventure"2 of judicial review under the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms.3 The entrenchment of a rights document in the
Canadian Constitution has undoubtedly brought changes to the protection
of human rights in this country. The Charter has, perhaps, enhanced
our rights, but more obviously, it has guaranteed "a particular way of
making decisions about rights in which the judicial branch of government
has a much more systematic and authoritative role.", The role of the
courts has not only expanded, but has changed in a fairly radical way.
Rather than simply deciding which level of government ought to have
jurisdiction over a particular public policy, the judiciary has now been
invited to hold legislative decisions up to scrutiny against a higher
constitutional standard, and perhaps decide that no level of government
can legislate in a given area.
o Copyright, 1987, Pamela A. Chapman.
* Student-at-law, Gowling & Henderson, Toronto. The author would like to thank Professor
Patrick Monahan and Mr. Edward Babin for their insight and encouragement in the development
of this paper, while holding no-one but herself responsible for its assertions.
1 M. Tushnet, "Truth, Justice and the American Way: An Interpretation of Public Law
Scholarship in the Seventies" (1979) 57 Texas L. Rev. 1307 at 1320.
2 A. Bayefsky and M. Cohen, "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and Public
International Law" (1983) 61 Can. B. Rev. 265 at 266.
3 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982 being Schedule
B of the Canada Act 1982, (U.K.), c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
4 P. Russell, "The Effect of a Charter of Rights on the Policy-Making Role of Canadian
Courts" (1982) 25 Can. Pub. Admin. 1 at 32.
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Section 525 of the Charter gives the courts of Canada their authority
to declare legislation inoperative, but it is section 16 that prescribes their
mandate, guaranteeing as it does the rights and freedoms enshrined in
the Charter "subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law
as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society." Thus
the rights set out are not absolute rights, but require that the judiciary
assess any government action that purports to limit them for its "reason-
ableness" balancing the value of the infringed right against the value
of some public policy. Section 1 embodies the conflict between individual
rights, as protected by the Charter, and the goals of the collective, as
represented by legislative initiative, making the judiciary umpires of the
balancing process.
As discussed in the second part of this paper, much of the controversy
over and analysis of judicial review has centred on the involvement of
the courts in this "balancing of competing interests." The problem for
legal theorists has been to demonstrate that judges have some unique
method of adjudicating these conflicts, a method that reflects their special
attributes and expertise but does not compromise their legitimacy as
supposedly non-political actors. Thus the formalist "four-corners-of-the-
document", theories, the positivism of H.L.A. Harts and the normative,
natural-law theory of Ronald Dworkin?9 all attempt to establish guidelines
and sources for legal reasoning that avoid "political" choices yet are
determinative of the appropriate outcomes.
Challengers of these paradigms - first the legal realists, and now
advocates of the Critical Legal Studies Movement - argue quite
compellingly that no real distinction between "legal" and "political"
reasoning can be sustained, especially in the admittedly "penumbral"
area of constitutional-rights adjudication. Arguably, the vague, nebulous
terms of section 1 of the Charter, and the essentially normative conflict
it describes, make cases decided under it classic examples of the
inadequacy of conventional legal reasoning to guide judicial discretion
and differentiate it from the political policy-making it purports to review.
5 Charter, supra, note 3, s. 52. Section 52(1) states "The Constitution of Canada is the supreme
law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the
extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect."
6 Ibid, s. 1 [hereinafter section 1]. Section 1 states "The Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society."
7 John Hart Ely uses the term "interpretivism" to describe the theory that judges deciding
constitutional issues should confine themselves to enforcing norms that are stated or clearly implicit
in the written Constitution; see his discussion of various "four-comers-of-the-document" theories
in Chapters 1 and 2 of Democracy and Distrust (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980).
s H.LA Hart, The Concept of Law (London: Oxford University Press, 1961).
9 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977).
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Unfortunately, a survey of the "early returns" on Charter case law
reveals, in the third part of this paper, trends in the analysis of section
1 that seem to indicate a failure by thejudiciary to consider the implications
of their new role. The Supreme Court of Canada has, until recently,
notably avoided section 1, choosing instead to articulate a variety of
threshold tests that obviate the need for explicit consideration of section
l's meaning. The judgment in R v. Oakes was the first case to deal
directly with the terms of section 1, but in it the Chief Justice attempts
to devise a formalist "test" for the resolution of difficult balancing tasks.
The limited usefulness of this approach can be seen in the cases which
follow Oakes, in which the justices of the Supreme Court continue to
utilize threshold tests, legislative deference, and simple denial to avoid
the implications of the limitations clause. All of these approaches can
be seen to evidence adherence to traditional theories of legal reasoning
and formalist analysis, and therefore reflect a denial of the normative
and political values inherent in decision making under the Charter.o If
the judiciary continues to take this narrow view of their role in interpreting
the Charter, Canada may well lose the opportunities our new constitution
provides for discussion and development - of both a new understanding
of the judicial role in our governing institutions, and of a new consensus
on the ruling principles of our polity. This thesis is developed more fully
in the concluding section of this paper.
II. JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SECTION 1
Section 1 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms establishes a way
of adjudicating conflicts over human rights that may be unique to Canada.
Unlike the U.S. Bill of Rights, which articulates rights absolutely and
leaves it to the judiciary to read in a standard of reasonable limits, the
Charter presents the Canadian judiciary with a pre-fabricated limitations
clause. This may be perceived as a restraint on judicial discretion, but
section 1 is somewhat more open-ended than the similar clauses in
international conventions upon which it was modelled. Most of these
conventions enumerate explicit public goals that can be considered
"reasonable,"- whereas the terms of section 1 are phrased in vague
10 "Legal reasoning is formalistic when the mere invocation of rules and the deduction of
conclusions from them is believed sufficient for every authoritative legal choice." R. Unger, Law
in Modem Society (New York Free Press, 1976) at 194.
tI An example of such a clause is Article 10 of the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Freedoms, which allows restrictions on the freedoms of expression that are
prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or
morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of
information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
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generalities, indeterminate of meaning through their imprecision, yet at
the same time "inviting of moral and political inquiry.",2
Rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter are subject to "such
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in
a free and democratic society."13 Central to this formula is the notion
of reasonable limits, a notion that invites reference to some principle
or policy lying beyond the words themselves in order to infuse the term
"reasonable" with some specific content. The rest of the section modifies
this phrase but fails to establish any particular meaning. While the limits
must be "prescribed by law," no definition of what "law" includes is
offered, and it is unclear whether the phrase is intended as a threshold
question to limit resort to section 1, or whether it was a mere rhetorical
inclusion. The assertion that reasonable limits under section 1 must be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society points to some
evidentiary or burden of proof requirements, but beyond that does not
add much to the definition of the section. The values of "freedom" and
"democracy" seem to have been invoked, but as a guide to decision
they have severe limitations themselves. Not only are they two elements
of society that may be perceived to be in conflict, or at least not wholly
reconcilable, they are concepts that are in some sense "essentially
contested," that is: "[T]here is no one clearly definable general use of
any of them which can be set up as the correct or standard use."14
Democracy, especially, is a concept "the proper use of which inevitably
involves endless disputes,"s and is therefore incapable of infusing specific
content into the notion of "reasonableness" in section 1.
The open-ended words of the section, therefore, circumscribe a
conflict between values but fail to provide a resolution. The limitations
clause guarantees the freedoms enumerated in the Charter, but at the
same time it allows qualifications of those rights subject to certain criteria.
This establishes tension between two political theories associated with
liberalism and also with traditional legal thought. One is premised on
the notion that individual rights must have priority over the will of the
majority. The other, utilitarianism, claims that the goal of society must
be the aggregate welfare of its members and that this, where reasonable,
supersedes individual rights. Determination of an appropriate point of
balance between these values reproduces the eternal and apparently
12 W. Conklin, "Interpreting and Applying the Limitations Clause: An Analysis of Section
1" (1982) 4 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 75 at 75.
13 Charter, supra, note 3, s. 1.
14 W.B. Galie, "Essentially Contested Concepts" (1956) 56 Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society 167 at 168.
15 Ibid at 169.
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irreconcilable conflicts of man in society - freedom versus order and
the individual versus the collective. Moreover, the process of deciding
whether a governmental action meets the criterion of reasonableness
requires exactly the kind of political cost-benefit analysis that Chief Justice
Laskin had in mind when he stated: "[T]he wisdom or expediency or
likely success of a particular policy expressed in legislation is not subject
to judicial review."16 It seems that with the enactment of the Charter,
and by the words of section 1, we have delegated to the Canadian judiciary
a mandate that classical constitutional thought is preoccupied with
justifying and at the same time restraining.
The problem that rights adjudication presents for traditional legal
theories is that it challenges on a more explicit level than other forms
of "legal" reasoning the idea that one can find or invent "a small set
of general principles that can be applied in many specific instances"
to determine outcomes - or at least "severely constrain the possible
outcomes."' 7 General rejection of the literalist notion that "texts have
any inherent meaning"18 has dealt extreme formalism a serious blow,
but the positivist theory of H.L.A. Hart still attempts to limit judicial
interpretation to consideration of only the "legal" materials. The ap-
plication of a complex "rule of recognition" determines what can properly
be considered a "legal" source.,9 Thus Hart argues that judges need cross
the line between law and policy only interstitially, in "penumbral cases."0
Judicial review almost inevitably falls within this penumbra, however,
for as Hart himself concedes: "Judicial decision, especially on matters
of high constitutional import, often involves a choice between moral
values," although he adds that the judiciary will bring to this choice
"a concern to deploy some acceptable general principle as a reasoned
basis for decision."2,
This belief that "the otherwise unbounded process of 'interest
balancing' can be rendered non-political by the instrument of 'principled
reasoning'"22 is also characteristic of scholars such as Ronald Dworkin
16 Reference re Anti-Inflation Act [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373 at 425.
17 J.W. Singer, "The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory" (1984) 94 Yale W.
I at 10.
18 PJ. Monahan, "At Doctrine's Twilight: The Structure of Canadian Federalism" (1984) 34
U. Toronto U. 47 at 81.
19 Hart, supra, note 8 at 92-93.
20 Ibid at 132.
21 Ibid. at 200.
22 Monahan, supra, note 18 at 69.
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and John Hart Ely. Dworkin puts forward a sort of "normative logiC"23
that recognizes the moral element in judicial decision making but at
the same time seeks to constrain it:
We must accept that the Supreme Court must make important political decisions.
The issue is rather what reasons are, in its hands, good reasons. My own view
is that the Court should make decisions of principle rather than policy - decisions
about what rights people have under our constitutional system rather than decisions
about how the general welfare is best promoted....
24
Judges are limited not only by this principle-policy distinction, but by
the means they are expected to use to select the appropriate principle.
In the words of Peter Gabel, they must proceed "by an intuitive
apprehension of the principle's relationship to the moral direction of the
community's political institutions,"- which comes down to a sort of
conventional political morality. Ely draws a distinction between law and
policy on different grounds than does Dworkin, arguing for a
"representation-reinforcing" rather than "value-protecting" approach to
judicial review,
fueled not by a desire on the part of the court to vindicate particular substantive
values it had determined were important or fundamental, but rather by a desire
to ensure that the political process - which is where such values are properly
identified, weighed, and accommodated - was open to those of all viewpoints
on something approaching an equal basis.2 6
Such a "process" theory, however, represents a particular concept of
equality that can itself be considered a substantive value, and therefore
suggests the possibility that there may be other values worthy of protection.
As Dworkin has said, "intention and process are mischievous ideas because
they cover up these substantive decisions with procedural piety, and
pretend they have not been made."27
This same criticism has been directed at Dworkin. The possibility
of his judge-as-Hercules ascertaining an objectively valid and discernible
principle seems in the final analysis to come down to his own belief
that equal concern and respect28 is the foundational principle of modem
23 P. Gabel, Book Review (1977) 91 Harv. L. Rev. 302 at 306. Dworkin's theory can be
characterized as "normative" because he recognizes that the decisions of the court, at least on
constitutional matters, involve making important moral and even political choices. He asserts a
form of "logic," however, by claiming that the judiciary can, and does, structure these choices
according to the guidelines discussed below. Thus, the term "normative logic" seems apt.
24 R. Dworkin, "The Forum of Principle" (1981) 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 469 at 516 [emphasis
added].
25 Gabel, supra, note 23 at 304.
26 Ely, supra, note 7 at 74.
27 Dworkin, supra, note 24 at 470-71.
28 Dworkin, supra, note 9 at 272-73.
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society. Adherents of the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement have
accused both Hart and Dworkin of converting normative statements into
descriptive statements, of turning "questions that require active judgment
and choice.., into questions that seem to require only passive mimicry."29
By analyzing the indeterminacy, manipulability, and reliance on non-
objective judicial value choices inherent in all of these theories,3o these
scholars have sought to establish that "ultimately, choices can be made
only by resort to the same forms of moral and ethical arguments generally
that are found in political disputes."3,
In Canada, this debate over the possibility of determinacy and
neutrality in judicial review has had only limited impact. Perhaps this
is because the role of our courts in federalism disputes and in quasi-
constitutional Canadian Bill of Right2 adjudication has appeared so
innocuous compared to the more radical intervention of the u.s. Supreme
Court.3 Even a more critical analyst like Paul Weiler, who has established
a solid case against judicial intervention in industrial relations and
federalism disputes, appears surprisingly acquiescent to the view of the
court as "defender of our civil liberties."3,
The enactment of the Charter witnessed a considerable debate over
the pros and cons of entrenchment and there has been general recognition
of the tension between adjudicative and political roles created by a rights
document.3s There is a real paucity, however, of theoretical studies of
these implications, despite a massive literature on the technical aspects
of the Charter.36 Most of the articles written on section 1 have taken
a rather mechanical view of its operation, attempting to "venture a measure
of precision and predictability in both its interpretation and its appli-
cation."37 A few analysts have mounted attempts to define and delimit
29 Singer, supra, note 17 at 29.
30 P. Brest, "The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative
Constitutional Scholarship" (1981) 90 Yale L.. 1063 at 1096.
31 A. Hutchinson & P. Monahan, "The Rights Stuff- Roberto Unger and Beyond" (1984) 62
Texas L. Rev. 1477 at 1485.
32 Canadian Bill of Rights, R.S.C. 1970, Appendix III
33 For example, see the controversial decisions relating to abortion, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973), and desegregation, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
34 P. Weiler, In the Last Resort (Toronto: Carswell, 1974), especially at 206.
35 See for example, Russell, supra, note 4 at 19; M. Gold, "Equality Before the Law in the
SCC: a case study" (1980) 18 Osgoode Hall I.J. 336 at 338.
36 For an early biography, see R.A. MacDonald, "Postcript and Prelude - the Jurisprudence
of the Charter Eight Theses" (1982) 4 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 321 at 321, note 2.
37 Conklin, supra, note 12 at 75; see also T. Christian, "The Limitation of Liberty: A
Consideration of Section 1 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms" [1982] U.B.C. L. Rev. 105;
P.W. Hogg, Canada Act 1982 Annotated (Toronto: Carswell, 1982) at 9-13; H. Marx, "Entrenchment,
Limitations and Non-Obstante" in W. Tarnopolsky and G. Beaudoin, eds., The Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms Commentary (Toronto: Carswell, 1982) 61 at 62-70.
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judicial discretion under the Charter. Barry suggests that the primary
goal of statutory interpretation ought to be the determination of the social
policy intended by Parliament,3s Fairley puts forward an Ely-like standard
whereby judges ought only to aim to perfect the democratic process,39
and Bender suggests that guidelines for the application of section 1 "are
mainly to be found in - or derived from - the subsequent provisions
of the Charter that define and describe the guaranteed rights that the
Charter seeks to protect."40
On a different level, Hovius and Martin have argued that the courts
will avoid taking on any new, activist role, and "will instead strive to
ensure that the legislatures continue to bear the responsibility for
determining social policy."4, The common element in all these analyses,
however, is an avoidance and implicit denial of the possibility that section
1 in fact requires that thejudiciary make essentially normative and political
choices.
As discussed earlier, the conflict that section 1 describes and requires
the judiciary to mediate appears on its face to require the input of moral
and political values: "[J]udges are faced with essentially open-ended moral
categories into which they must pour precise meaning and content."42
As well, most adjudication under section 1 will "involve conflicts between
legitimate interests on either side, and require a delicate adjustment for
a satisfactory resolution."43 This process of balancing and mediation is
normally considered to be part of the development of policy and the
responsibility of the legislature. The explicit invitation in section 1, for
the judiciary to evaluate the considerations that have gone into the
formulation of a specific legislative approach, seems to rule out even
Professor Dworkin's principle-policy dichotomy or at least blur an already
nebulous distinction beyond the point of usefulness. Section 1 poses a
difficult, perhaps insurmountable challenge to our traditional theories of
legal reasoning. As one of the few constitutional thinkers to acknowledge
this difficulty has noted:
38 L.D. Barry, "Law, Policy and Statutory Interpretation under a Constitutionally Entrenched
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1982) 60 Can. B. Rev. 237.
39 H.S. Fairley, "Enforcing the Charter Some Thoughts on an Appropriate and Just Standard
for Judicial Review" (1982) 4 Sup. CtL L. Rev. 217.
40 P. Bender, "Justifications for Limiting Constitutionally Guaranteed Rights and Freedoms;
Some Remarks About the Proper Role of Section 1 of the Canadian Charter" (1983) 13 Man.
L.J. 669 at 676.
41 B. Hovius & R. Martin, "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in the Supreme
Court of Canada" (1983) 61 Can. B. Rev. 354 at 355.
42 Weiler, supra, note 34 at 213.
43 Ibid
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[T]he kind of litigation an entrenched document engenders is not suited to
adjudicative solution: the issues in dispute are polycentric, and are based on multiple
interacting criteria; the standards to be applied are directed not to acts, but rather
to intentions; and most importantly, the range of relevant justificatory materials
necessarily must stretch beyond the narrow concept of a record....44
The next section of this paper will examine a number of cases decided
since the 1982 entrenchment to consider how successful our judiciary,
and especially the Supreme Court of Canada, have been in meeting this
monumental challenge.
III. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF SECTION 1 BEFORE R v.
OAKES: AVOIDANCE
The case law decided under the Charter since 1982 is replete with
ringing judicial pronouncements of a new role for the courts, of a "new
dimension, a new yardstick of reconciliation between the individual and
the community and their respective rights, a dimension which, like the
balance of the Constitution, remains to be interpreted and applied by
the Court."45 Some judges appear to have explicitly recognized the
normative element inherent in this new venture: "It requires, perhaps
for the first time in our national history, that judges articulate the
fundamental values of society and set their order of priority."46 In general,
though, the case law provides few clues as to how the judiciary intends
to accomplish this weighty task, and is in fact characterized most notably
by avoidance (and occasional denial) of the challenge presented to legal
reasoning by section 1. Judges speaking outside the confines of ajudgment
have noted the need for the judiciary to develop new attitudes and
techniques to evaluate a wide range of societal values without "refuge
in traditional legal language and concepts."47 Their focus, however, has
been on the need to "affect the sources on which the courts must rely
for guidance",8 through changes in the rules of evidence, standing, and
intervention. In early Charter cases, the Supreme Court of Canada, where
it discussed the limitations clause at all, largely avoided any development
of the section 1 mandate by relying on a series of "threshold tests" that
44 MacDonald, supra, note 36 at 337.
4s Law Society of Upper Canada v. Skapinker [1984] 1 S.C.R. 357 at 366-67.
46 R v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd (1984) 28 Alta. L.R. (2d) 289 at 309 (C.A.).
47 Hon. D.G. Blair (of the Ontario Court of Appeal), "The Charter and the Judges: A View
from the Bench" (1983) 13 Man. L.J. 445 at 449-50.
48 Hon. G.V. La Forest (then of the New Brunswick Court of Appeal), "The Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms: An Overview" (1983) 61 Can. B. Rev. 19 at 24; see also Blair, supra,
note 47 at 450-5 1.
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precluded direct consideration of the implications of the section. A brief
survey of the case law will serve to elaborate this trend.
Only one case at the Supreme Court level has yet been decided
under a section 1 redemption of a rights violation, which to some extent
may explain the highest court's hesitancy to elaborate on its meaning
and application. The lack of an ideal case, however, cannot entirely justify
the lengths to which the court seems to have gone in failing to advance,
until the Oakes9 case, to any explicit consideration of section 1. In
Skapinker, the court did not proceed to a discussion of section 1 because
it declared that the right in question had not been violated.5o A finding
of an infringement of section 7 in the Singh case, however, did not lead
to a thorough discussion of section 1 despite Wilson J.'s recognition that
the question of what standards the court should use in applying section
1 was one "of enormous significance for the operation of the Charter."s'
While asserting that utilitarian considerations based on administrative
convenience would not be adequate to constitute a section 1 justification,52
she declined to make further observations as to what factors might deserve
consideration.53
Such a refusal to speculate may well be commendable in dealing
with a consitutional document, but it causes problems for lower courts
attempting, without guidance, to deal with a wide variety of justifications.
This is certainly the case when dealing with the interface between section
1 and sections of the Charter that seem to carry their own implicit
limitations. The analysis of the unreasonable search and seizure provisions
of section 8 in Hunter v. Southams, considers the meaning of "reasonable"
in that section in a fashion analogous to the endeavour under section
1:
[A]n assessment must be made as to whether in a particular situation the public's
interest in being left alone by government must give way to the government's
interest in intruding on the individual's privacy in order to advance its goals .... 55
The court noted that the guarantee against "unreasonable" conduct lacked
both specificity and a context from which to derive an "obvious gloss"
on its meaning,56 an insight which might also be applied to the phrase
49 R v. Oakes (1986) 19 C.RR. 308 (S.C.C.).
SO Law Society of Upper Canada v. Skapinker, supra, note 45 at 383.
51 Singh v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177 at 217.
52 Ibid at 219.
3 Ibid at 220.
54 Hunter v. Southam Ina, [198412 S.C.R. 145.
55 Ibid at 159-60.
56 Ibid at 155.
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"reasonable limits." In dealing with section 1, however, the court hedges
the question of whether an "unreasonable" search and seizure could
nonetheless be considered a "reasonable" limit.57
Similarly, the Supreme Court did not proceed to a consideration
of section 1 in the Operation Dismantle case, despite an analysis by Wilson
J. that relies heavily on the notion that rights in the Charter must of
necessity be interpreted so as to accommodate both the rights of others
and the mandate of the state. In determining that the challenged
government action in the case was never intended to be caught by section
7, Madame Justice Wilson states that: "The rights under the Charter
not being absolute, their content or scope must be discerned quite apart
from any limitation sought to be imposed upon them by the government
under s. 1."58
Whether or not these attempts to confine "balancing" analyses to
the definition of a right indicate an avoidance of section 1, they do
perpetuate confusion as to the structure of the Charter's constitutional
protection and ignore the burden of proof and evidentiary questions that
arise. The approach of Wilson J. is especially puzzling considering her
admirable attempt in the same case to articulate an appropriate level
of judicial review in cases involving "political questions" or raising
questions of justiciability. While the learned justice conceded that some
issues could be labelled non-justiciable "because they involve moral and
political considerations which it is not within the province of the courts
to assess,"59 she nonetheless asserts that "however unsuited courts may
be for the task, they are called upon all the time to decide questions
of principle and policy."6o The limitations clause is central to Wilson
J.'s view of this judicial responsibility to review political decisions where
they affect constitutionally-protected rights:
Section 1, in my opinion, is the uniquely Canadian mechanism through which
the courts are to determine the justiciability of particular issues that come before
it.... It obviates the need for a 'political questions' doctrine and permits the court
to deal with what might be termed 'prudential' considerations in a principled way
without renouncing its constitutional and mandated responsibility for judicial
review.61
Considering the important role that section 1 appears to play in balancing
the political and judicial roles in Wilson J.'s theory of judicial review,
57 Ibid at 169.
58 Operation Dismantle Inc. v. The Queen (1985) 59 N.R. 1 at 56.
59 Ibid at 27.
60 Ibd [emphasis added].
61 Ibid at 58.
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it is disappointing that she declines to proceed to its analysis in the
Operation Dismantle case, which raised a particularly controversial
question.
This identification of the policy-making or policy-reviewing function
of the courts with the terms of section 1 is to be seen in the B. C. Reference,62
yet another case which addressed the interface between sections 1 and
7. Any substantial analysis of section 1 in that case was avoided by
the judgment that a limit on section 7 effected through a violation of
principles of fundamental justice could only in the most exceptional of
circumstances be sustained under section 1. Wilson J. articulated this
preclusion absolutely, suggesting that "the concepts are mutually exclu-
sive,"63 while Justice Lamer cited "natural disasters, the outbreak of war,
epidemics, and the like",, as the only types of rationale under section
1 likely to justify a violation of section 7. At the same time, however,
the court makes it clear that the public interest as justification for
government action is not a factor to be considered in determining whether
or not a violation of section 7 has occurred.65
The intimation, therefore, seems to be that public policy justifications
have no role to play in the analysis, beyond a sort of section 1 emergency
doctrine, which is borne out by Lamer J.'s attempts to define the scope
and content of the principles of fundamental justice invoked by section
7. Much of his determination rests on what he describes as a "purposive"
approach to the Charter, articulating "objective and manageable stand-
ards" that "secure for persons the full benefit of the Charters protection
under s. 7, while avoiding adjudication of the merits of public policy."66
It is this latter restriction on the court's function that seems to concern
the learned Justice most, and which, he argues, is central to many analysts'
concern over any expansion of section 7 to include a notion of substantive
due process. He suggests that fear of the courts coming "to adjudicate
upon the merits of public policy" has led to "the characterization of
the (section 7) issue in a narrow and restrictive fashion,"6 focusing on
the distinction between procedural and substantive due process rather
than on the meaning of principles "found in the basic tenets of our legal
system."68 Mr. Justice Lamer emphasizes that meaningful content can
62 Reference Re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C) (1986), 63 N.R. 266 (S.C.C.).
63 Ibid at 291.
64 Ibid at 285.
65 Ibid at 284-85.
66 Ibid at 274.
67 Ibid at 273.
68 Ibid at 276.
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be attributed to section 7, all the while avoiding adjudication of policy
matters, and thus the furor over substantive due process.
This judgment can be seen to be organized around an assertion
made early on in the report of the case: "In neither case, be it before
or after the Charter, have the courts been enabled to decide upon the
appropriateness of policies underlying legislative enactments."69 As the
court recognizes that section 1 not only invites but demands a consideration
of the public interest, such as the need for a "legislative scheme aimed
at reducing the human and economic costs of bad driving,"70 it faces
an increasing conffict between the terms of the limitations clause and
its view of its own role. The definition of a right, however, appears to
be an enterprise more consonant with a view of legal reasoning as statutory
interpretation or "purposive analysis." It is instructive that the Supreme
Court attributes a "balancing of interests" function to section 1 but still
seems anxious to complete its analysis under the definition of a right
or freedom.
Confusion over where the definition of a right ends and the balancing
exercise under section 1 ought to begin is particularly evident under
sections 7 and 10 because the words "unreasonable" and "in accordance
with principles of fundamental justice" appear to make the rights "self-
limiting." The difficulties in these cases point, however, to a more general
problem with the notion of legal reasoning in the context of the Charter
as a whole. The interpretation of even a "pure" right such as freedom
of expression will inevitably entail decisions about which interests are
worthy of protection. Political and artistic expression might fit within
the definition of the right, for example, while speech having a commercial
flavour was excluded from its ambit, Would such a decision differ in
any meaningful way from a judgment which defined the freedom more
broadly, but held that certain restrictions on public nudity were in the
public interest and therefore "reasonable limits demonstrably justified"
under section 1? Any number of examples could be invoked to show
that: "The indeterminacy and manipulability of levels of generality is
closely related, if not ultimately identical, to the arbitrariness inherent
in accommodating fundamental rights with competing government in-
terests."72 There is clearly an analogy to be made, therefore, between
the analysis under section 1 and the problem of infusing highly abstract
statements of rights with some determinate content. The completion of
69 Ibid at 272.
70 Ibid at 286, quoting from the appellant's factum.
71 See Koumoudouros v. Toronto (1984), 2 O.A.C. 54 especially at 61-62.
72 Brest, supra, note 30 at 1085.
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a Charter analysis within the definition of a right does not mean that
the political and moral choices inherent in the problem have been avoided
as much as disguised by the more formal language of "violations" and
"breach."
Whether these cases evidence prudence or folly in their avoidance
of the limitations provisions, they can be seen to establish threshold tests,
such as the violation of a right, which must be passed before the invocation
of section 1. Three other Supreme Court cases have used similar reasoning,
but their rationales for effectively precluding consideration of section
1 have been a little more complex and therefore more difficult to explain
as simply cautious statutory interpretation. Perhaps the best example is
the Protestant School Boards,3 case, which was really the first Supreme
Court case to discuss section 1. After concluding that Quebec language
legislation was clearly in violation of section 23 of the Charter,74 the
court asserted that Bill 10175 "cannot possibly have been regarded by
the framers of the Constitution as coming within 'such reasonable limits
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic
society."'76 The court seemed to feel that section 23 was enacted with
a view to correcting just this kind of linguistic regime and that the
legislation therefore challenged the right's very basis and could not possibly
be legitimized under section 1. This can be perceived to some extent
as an historical or originalist approach attempting to ascertain and enforce
the intentions of the framers, but the Court tried to make it clear that
its decision was not premised on the existence of this particular legislative
scheme at the time of the Charter's enactment." Rather, its analysis focused
on the level of the breach, following the lower courts' distinction between
a "limitation" and a "denial" of a Charter right, the latter never being
redeemable under section 1.78 The court asserted that, whatever their
actual scope, reasonable limits could never be so broad as to constitute
an amendment or exception to the Charter guarantees, such as that
contemplated by the section 33 override." In other words, a limit so
onerous that it constitutes a denial is prima facie unreasonable.
73 Quebec Association of Protestant School Boards v. A.G. Quebec [1984] 2 S.C.R. 66.
74 Ibid at 67.
75 Ibid
76 Ibid at 84.
77 Ibid at 85.
78 Quebec Association of Protestant School Boards v. A.G. Quebec (1982), 140 D.L.R.(3d) 33
at 59 (Que. S.C.); QuebecAssociation of Protestant SchoolBoards v. AG. Quebec (1983), I D.L.R.(4th)
573 at 575-76 (Que. C.A.). *
79 Quebec Association of Protestant SchoolBoards v. AG. Quebec, supra, note 73 at 88. Subsection
33(1) of the Charter reads "Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare
in an Act of Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a provision
thereof shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of this
Charter."
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This distinction based on the immensity of a breach is a rather
nebulous one, as the notion that section 1 does not effectively apply
to a denial but only a limitation would seem to be ultimately manipulable.
In the Protestant School Boards case it allowed the Supreme Court to
decide, having "only assumed for the sake of discussion, without deciding
the point,"8o that section 1 applied to section 23, and without any
consideration of the extensive evidence put forward to support the Quebec
legislation, that Bill 101 could not be justified. This concern to find some
resolution of the question without actual resort to section 1 has been
echoed in two more recent cases. In R v. Big MDrug Mart Ltd.81 Dickson
CJ.C. does not really consider the adequacy of the federal government's
submissions on public convenience, order, and health, for he concludes
that such objectives would be ultra vires the federal Parliament and could
never, therefore, constitute reasonable limits under section 1.82 Similarly,
the court in R v. Therens states that section 1 is not called into question
because the accused's right to counsel was limited arbitrarily by police,
and therefore not "prescribed by law."83 Thus, only a limitation that is
required by legislative provisions or results "by implication from their
terms or operating requirements"84 will be considered under section 1.
In all of these cases, substantive questions such as the extent of provincial
powers in the treatment of linguistic minorities, the status of "secondary
purposes" in justifying suspect legislation, and the appropriate timing
and extent of police warnings in different circumstances were neglected
in favour of the articulation of "formulas" for the exclusion of section
1.
What all these Supreme Court cases have in common, therefore,
is a paucity of discussion as to the meaning and implications of the
terms of section 1. Despite apparent recognition of the importance of
developing principles under which government objectives can be balanced
against constitutionally protected rights,85 the court had consistently
avoided any direct confrontation with that task until the release of R
v. Oakes in February 1986. This failure to address section 1 may point
to a more general reluctance to recognize the political and moral elements
inherent in decision making under the Charter, a trend that is not really
80 Ibid at 85.
81 R v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd (1985), 58 N.R. 81 (S.C.C.).
82 Ibid at 117.
83 R v. Therens (1985), 59 N.R 122 at 124.
84 Ibid at 136.
85 R v. Big M Drug Mart Ld, supra, note 81 at 116.
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reversed by Oakes, despite the Court's attempt in that case to begin to
set out an authoritative approach to the interpretation of section 1.
IV. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF SECTION 1 IN R v. OAKES:
FORMALISM
R v. Oakes will undoubtedly become an often-cited authority for
its interpretation of section 1. Chief Justice Dickson recognizes that the
rights and freedoms set out in the Charter are not absolute, but rather
may be limited "in circumstances where their exercise would be inimical
to the realization of collective goals of fundamental importance."86 He
sets out the "criteria of justification"87 for such limitations and starts
with a number of explicit assertions which largely echo the decisions
of lower courts. Among these assertions are: the onus of proof in a section
1 defence "rests upon the party seeking to uphold the limitation";88 the
standard of proof is the civil standard of "proof by a preponderance
of probability," applied rigorously;9 and the evidence should be "cogent
and persuasive," the party presenting it making it clear to the court "the
consequences of imposing or not imposing the limit."o
After these preliminary observations, Dickson CJ.C. goes on to set
out the two central criteria that must be satisfied in order to meet the
terms of section 1:
First, the objective, which the measures responsible for a limit on a Charter right
or freedom are designed to serve, must be [shown to be] 'of sufficient importance'
... Second ... the party invoking s.1 must show that the means chosen are
reasonable and demonstrably justified.91
This second inquiry involves "a form of proportionality test,"92 requiring
the court to "balance the interests of society with those of individuals
and groups."93 In assessing the means chosen, the court must consider
three important factors:
86 R. v. Oakes, supra, note 49 at 335.
87 Ibid
88 Ibid; see also Re Southam Inc and the Queen (No. 1) (1983), 41 O.R.(2d) 113 at 124
(Ont. C.A.); Quebec Association of Protestant School Boards v. A.G. Quebec (Que. S.C.), supra,
note 78 at 59; Federal Republic of Germany v. Rauca (1983), 38 O.R.(2d) 705 at 715 (Ont. H.C.).
89 R. v. Oakes, ibid; see also Re Southam Inc and the Queen (No. 1) ibid at 129; Federal
Republic of Germany v. Rauca, ibid at 715-16.
90 R. v. Oakes, ibid at 336; see also Law Society of Upper Canada v. Skapinker, supra, note
45 at 383-84; Singh v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, supra, note 51 at 217.
91 R. v. Oakes, ibid at 336-37.
92 ?. v. Big M Drug Mart, supra, note 81 at 116.
93 R v. Oakes, supra, note 49 at 337.
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[T]he measures adopted must be carefully designed to achieve the objective in
question ... [they] should impair 'as little as possible' the right or freedom in
question... [and] there must be a proportionality between the effects of the measures
... and the objective.94
This formula for evaluating a section 1 limitation follows upon a number
of lower court decisions which have outlined the notions of "balancing,"
"proportionality," and "less onerous means."95
Perhaps the most notable element of the Oakes test is the very high
level of scrutiny that it appears to establish in the determination of an
issue under section 1. By requiring the demonstration of an important
government objective, and of both a rational connection and propor-
tionality between this goal and the means chosen, the court has placed
a fairly onerous burden on the party seeking to uphold a limitation. An
even higher standard has been imposed, however, by the assertion that
the means "should impair 'as little as possible' the right or freedom in
question."96 Such a "less drastic means" test, as articulated in American
jurisprudence under the First Amendment, has proved very difficult to
meet, since, "in one sense, a less repressive or even non-repressive
alternative is always available, provided that the government is willing
to sacrifice effectiveness."97 Perhaps the phrase "as little as possible"
is meant to include questions of cost-benefit analysis in the determination
of "possibility," but this is clear neither from the plain words of Dickson
c_.c.'s formulation, nor from the application of the Oakes test in recent
cases. In R v. Blainey,8 for example, the court relied on the phrase without
even specifying what alternate means might have been pursued.99 In any
event, the Supreme Court appears to have specifically denied the relevance
of practical, utilitarian considerations to section 1 analysis in the Singh
case.00
The Oakes decision, then, seems to come down squarely on the
side of individual rights in the section 1 calculus to the extent that it
makes government decisions difficult to justify under the limitation clause.
It may, in fact, if read strictly, make section 1 virtually unavailable as
94 Jbia
95 See for example Re Southam Inc and the Queen (No. 1), supra, note 88 at 129-30; Quebec
Association of Protestant School Boards v. A.G. Quebec (Que. S.C.), supra, note 78 at 77; R v.
Bryant (1984), 6 0.A.C. 118 at 123 (Ont. C.A.); National Citizens' Coalition Inc v. A.G. Canada,
[1984] 5 W.W.RL 436 at 453 (Alta. Q.B.).
96 R. v. Oakes, supra, note 49 at 337.
97 Note, "Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment" (1969) 78 Yale LJ. 464 at 468.
98 Re B/ainey and O.H.A. (1986), 54 O.R.(2d) 513.
99 Ibi at 530.
"00 Singh v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, supra, note 51 at 219.
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a forum for Charter decision making. While this will likely affect the
substantive analysis of the Charter in the future, it would also appear
to force much of the focus of argument back into the construction of
rights provisions. This, as noted above, does not necessarily change the
outcome but certainly changes the image of legal reasoning. In a strange
way, therefore, the direct tackling of section 1 by the court in Oakes
may result in the same obfuscation of the notion of "reasonable limits"
as did its earlier avoidance.
Confusion will undoubtedly arise in the application of the Oakes
decision because it hints, through its strict interpretation of section 1,
at a particular view of the Charter calculus, but passes up any explicit
articulation of a theory of rights for the delineation of a formalist "test."
If the Supreme Court's decision is perceived by another panel of judges
to represent a position weighted towards the protection of rights, and
that court agrees with such an interpretation, then the Oakes test will
undoubtedly be used to enforce the right or freedom in question and
preclude justification under section 1. On the other hand, the judiciary
may well feel that in a particular case an extremely important societal
goal or a less central right is at stake. This would justify a more intrusive
but nonetheless "reasonable" means of government action. In such a
case, a court might read the Oakes "test" narrowly, either by holding
the right not to have been violated, by finding the words "as little as
possible" to contain an evaluation of effectiveness and cost, or by relying
on Dickson cJ.c.'s general limiting words that, "the nature of the
proportionality test will vary depending on the circumstances."lo, The
courts' interpretation of Mr. Chief Justice Dickson's four-part test will
certainly indicate that a choice has been made, but can the test itself
truly structure and inform that choice?
The problem with the articulation of 'tests' for the application of
section 1, as was attempted in Oakes, is their limited usefulness in dictating
and explaining the final outcome of each balancing exercise. American
commentators have made compelling arguments that the use of terms
like "rationality" and "less drastic means" in constitutional jurisprudence
dealing with the Bill of Rights only confuses and obscures the real choices
inherent in comparing the relative merits of competing public policies.02
A note in the Yale Law Journal asserts that "it is always possible to
define the legislative purpose of a statute in such a way that the statutory
classification is rationally related to it," making the traditional rationality
test "an empty requirement and a misleading analytic device."03 The
101 P. v. Oakes, supra, note 49 at 337.
102 Notes, infra notes 97 and 103, supra, note 97 and infra, note 103.
103 Note, "Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection" (1972) 82 Yale L. 123
at 128.
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same problem can be seen with the inevitable availability of some "less
onerous means" if the phrase is read plainly. And, "since the Court lacks
the competency to measure the relative efficiency, cost, and repressive
effect of alternative measures, consideration of less drastic means cannot
provide any form or structure [to constitutional decision making]."o4
What all these tests seem to reduce to is the balancing of competing
interests that we began with, the essence of which is captured by the
final part of Dickson cJ.c.'s test and the notion of proportionality. His
invocation of "rationality" and "impair as little as possible" may assist
in this mental process of step-by-step balancing by forming a checklist
of factors to be weighed. These formulations are more likely, however,
to obscure judicial reasoning, for "[T]he nature of the conflict between
the political values at stake as well as the underlying bases of judicial
reasoning would be made more explicit if the competing public policies
were weighed outright without diversionary discussions.. . ."- o
The Oakes test is interesting as a catalogue of the types of arguments
that are likely to be made in the interpretation and analysis of section
1. It is reasonably clear, however, that the Supreme Court has suggested
a standard of review that weighs heavily in favour of individual rights,
without fully articulating a theory of rights that can either justify such
a degree of scrutiny, or constrain judicial choice in conformity with it.
Inasmuch as different courts are likely to have different views on the
underlying conflict between values that is inherent in section 1, they
are likely to have different views of their own role in the resolution
of that conflict, which will inevitably colour their interpretation of Dickson
CJ.C.'s test. The activism in the Oakes case has been paralleled in other
cases by a more conservative approach to judicial review, evidencing
a different perception of the appropriate "balance" between individual
rights and collective goals. In each of these cases, however, as in Oakes,
arguments and assertions about this balancing exercise are subordinated
to formalist modes of reasoning and traditional approaches such as
legislative deference.
V. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF SECTION 1 SINCE R v. OAKES
DOWN THE SLIPPERY SLOPE
The Charter cases decided by the Supreme Court of Canada since
R v. Oakes amply demonstrate the difficulty inherent in the use of a
formalist test in the resolution of constitutional questions dealing with
104 Note, supra, note 97 at 474.
105 Note, supra, note 103 at 154.
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rights. The reasons written by various members of the Supreme Court
bench confront these difficulties in different ways, but they all reveal
the avoidance of the political implications of their role that was evident
in the pre-Oakes period. The ineffectiveness of the Chief Justice's test
in answering the difficult questions posed by section 1 has apparently
led the judiciary back down the slippery slope of balancing and choice,
despite their continuing reliance on such avoidance techniques as re-
solution within the rights sections, threshold tests, and of course simple
denial.
Perhaps the most obvious aspect of the treatment of the Oakes test
in the more recent Supreme Court cases is the extent to which the test
is ignored. Only the dissent of Madame Justice Wilson in Jones v. The
Queeno6 and Chief Justice Dickson's reasons in Edwards Bookso7 deal
directly with the factors enumerated in R v. Oakes, out of a total of
eleven sets of reasons delivered in these two cases and Dolphin Delivery.,os
Both La Forest J. in Jones and McIntyre J. in Dolphin Delivery refer
to the Oakes decision, but only to cite Dickson CJ.C.'s words to the effect
that there may be cases where "no evidence" is required to prove a
section 1 justification.,-9 Other reasons advert often to the significance
of the Oakes statement on section 1, but do not go on to utilize its
apparently exhaustive recitation of the relevant factors.
Similarly, there is a noted avoidance in these cases of the seemingly
onerous standard of "least restrictive means." In Jones, the judgment
of La Forest J. appears to conclude the question of the constitutionality
of sections of the Alberta School Act dealing with private instruction
on the basis of a section 1 justification. After conceding that the Act
"does constitute some interference with the appellant's freedom of
religion,"io La Forest J. goes on to emphasize the compelling interest
of the province in the education of the young, noting that "it may, in
advancing this interest, place reasonable limits on the freedom of
[individuals].", The learned Justice concludes that the requirement of
a certificate of efficient instruction for private educators "constitutes a
minimal, or... peripheral intrusion on religion," the absence of which
"would create an unwarranted burden on the operation of a legitimate
legislative scheme to assure a reasonable standard of education."m
106 Jones v. The Queen, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 284.
107 R v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713.
108 RW.D.S.U. v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd, [1986] 2 S.C.tR 573.
109 Jones, supra, note 106 at 299; Dolphin Delivery, supra, note 108 at 590.
110 Jones, supra, note 106 at 295.
M' Ibid at 297.
112 Ibid at 299.
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The judgment of La Forest J. is puzzling for two reasons. First,
it contains no reference to the well-defined test in R v. Oakes, and in
its treatment of the "least restrictive means" part of the test it seems
to veer quite sharply away from Dickson CJ.C.'s earlier approach. This
is particularly interesting in that Chief Justice Dickson joined in the La
Forest judgment on Jones, the first Charter case decided following Oakes.
La Forest J. refuses in Jones to speculate as to how far the province
could go in imposing conditions on religious freedom in education, but
concludes that the present infringement is well justified."13 No further
discussion of the degree of restriction imposed ensues until, several pages
after concluding that the appellant cannot succeed in his Charter argument,
he refers to the approach to issues of efficient instruction taken by other
provinces. Considering the scheme of judicial determination available
in other jurisdictions, he notes that despite some increased benefits in
terms of detachment, court involvement would "create a more cumber-
some administrative structure.",,4 La Forest J. states that "some prag-
matism is involved in balancing between fairness and efficiency," and
that the province must be given some leeway to choose an administrative
structure unless it is "manifestly unfair."5
This balancing approach taken by La Forest J. is in sharp contrast
to the prima facie meaning of the phrase "least restrictive means," and
appears to provide a much more flexible standard incorporating a fair
degree of legislative deference. Combined with the admitted lack of
evidence put forward to establish a section 1 justification, it is hard to
reconcile the judgment in Jones with the rigorous and highly structured
approach outlined in Oakes. This conflict is perhaps related to the second
puzzling aspect of Mr. Justice La Forest's reasons. It is far from clear
in the judgment as to whether the case of the appellant fails on a section
1 justification or whether the court finds no violation of his section 2(a)
right to freedom of religion. While La Forest J. indicates early on in
the judgment that some interference with religious freedom is likely under
the School Act regime, and then goes on to take a balancing approach
consistent with section 1 analysis, he later suggests that Charter rights
must be interpreted "within reason."116 He then states that "I do not think
the appellant can succeed in his argument under section 2(a) of the
Charter.""1 In fact, the headnote to the Supreme Court Reports' report
11 Ibid at 298-99.
"4 Ibid at 304.
15 Ibid
116 Ibid at 300-01.
117 Ibid at 301.
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of the case suggests that La Forest J. finds no violation of sections 2(a)
or 7 in denying the appeal of Jones. However the case was actually
decided, it certainly shows continuing confusion about the enterprise under
section 1 and its connection with the catalogue of rights. It would be
ironic indeed if the test in Oakes is seen to require such a strict level
of scrutiny that any attempt at more flexible, policy-sensitive balancing
is forced back into the definition of a right.
It is certainly this result that is suggested by the dissent of Madame
Justice Wilson in Jones, who clearly finds no violation of section 2(a)
and does not, therefore, "save" the impugned sections under section 1.118
Wilson J. states that:
... even assuming that this legislation does affect the appellant's beliefs ... not
every effect of legislation on religious beliefs or practices is offensive to the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion.... [L]egislative or administrative
action whose effect on religion is trivial or insubstantial is not, in my view, a
breach of freedom of religion.119
The learned Justice rejects the argument that this kind of concern should
be dealt with under the limitations clause,12o and in fact concludes that
if the Act was found to be in violation of section 2(a) it could not be
saved under section 1.121 This conclusion appears to rest on Wilson J.'s
interpretation of the requirements of the Oakes test. She cites Oakes for
the proposition that, where a violation of a right has been found, the
means employed must impair as little as possible the freedom in question.122
As the government adduced no evidence to demonstrate that the cer-
tification approach was the least drastic means of effecting its goals,
Wilson J. concludes that they have not met the "stringent standard of
justification" lying upon them under Oakes.123
This avoidance of the Oakes test by a return to analysis within the
right seems to parallel the earlier avoidance of the terms of section 1
described above. Not surprisingly, this general avoidance has persisted.
In Jones, McIntyre J. is joined by both Beetz and LeDain, JJ. in concluding
that there is no violation of the appellant's freedom of religion.124 Similarly,
Beetz J. finds no violation of a Charter right in either the Dolphin Delivery
or Edwards Books,2 cases, and he is joined in the latter case by McIntyre
118 Ibid at 309.
119 Ibid at 313-14.
120 Ibid at 314; Wilson J. cites her earlier comment in Operation Dismantle, supra, note 58.
121 Ibid at 315.
122 bid
123 Ibid at 315, 322-23.
124 Ibid at 308.
1z Dolphin Delivery, supra, note 108 at 604; Edwards Books, supra, note 107 at 788.
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J. The majority decision in Dolphin Delivery authored by McIntyre J.
also evidences a form of "threshold" test. While concluding that "in
any form of picketing there is involved at least some element of
expression,"126 the learned Justice goes on to conclude that the Charter
does not apply to the action alleged to be an infringement. McIntyre
J. holds that the granting of an injunction pursuant to litigation between
private parties does not involve the requisite degree of governmental
action so as to attract constitutional scrutiny.127
The most recent case to deal with section 1 of the Charter, R v.
Edwards Books, is a particularly interesting example of the trends in
its analysis identified above. In addition, it is the first case where a majority
of the Supreme Court has redeemed an admitted violation of the Charter
as a reasonable limit under section 1, and it is Chief Justice Dickson's
first discussion of section 1 since R v. Oakes. The reasons of the Chief
Justice once again include a very thorough discussion of section 1.128
They represent a departure from his earlier comments in Oakes, however,
in a number of ways.
Dickson cJ.c. begins his discussion of section 1 in Edwards Books
with a review of the test articulated in Oakes. He goes on, however,
to emphasize and "reaffirm" a part of his dicta other than the well-
known list of factors:
The Court stated that the nature of the proportionality test would vary depending
on the circumstances. Both in articulating the standard of proof and in describing
the criteria comprising the proportionality requirement the Court has been careful
to avoid rigid and inflexible standards.29
As Dickson CJ.C. proceeds to apply the Oakes test to the question of
the reasonableness of Ontario's Retail Business Holidays Act, he focuses
on just such a variable, flexible approach to its application. This is
especially clear when he deals with the question of "least onerous means."
Dickson CJ.C. imparts quite a different meaning to the term by the addition
of the word "reasonable" to the standard. Thus, the question becomes
whether the Act abridges the freedom of religion of Saturday observers
"as little as is reasonably possible,"13o and the Court asks if there is "some
reasonable alternative scheme which would allow the province to achieve
its objective with fewer detrimental effects on religious freedom",31
[emphasis added].
126 Dolphin Delivery, supra, note 108 at 586.
127 Ibid at 592-600.
128 Edwards Books, supra, note 107 at 768.
129 Ibid at 768-69.
130 Ibid at 772 [emphasis added].
131 Ibid at 773.
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It is submitted that the effect of this modification of the words used
in Oakes is to greatly reduce the strictness of the original standard, in
that it returns us to the central notion of balancing of interests. It is
impossible to guess whether the Chief Justice has altered his approach
in recognition of the particular difficulties identified with the "less drastic
means" test experienced in the U.S. constitutional jurisprudence and
discussed above. It is a reasonable suggestion, however, that Dickson
C.J.c. might have been anxious to respond to the problems with the rigidity
of the standard evidenced in the judgments of his colleagues, particularly
that of Wilson J. in Jones. Further, it is reasonably clear, even on the
facts discussed by Dickson CJ.C. himself in Edwards Books, that a less
restrictive means of ensuring a common pause day could be designed
through a system of exemptions different from the Ontario version. Chief
Justice Dickson downplays both the under- and over-inclusive nature
of the Ontario provisions with respect to Sabbatarian exemptions, and
the availability of other, perhaps better tailored schemes. The main
comparison he undertakes is with the New Brunswick legislation which
provides an exemption for those with sincerely held religious beliefs.
Dickson cJ.c. concludes that both schemes, while "genuine and serious
attempts" to minimize the infringement of minority rights, provide
incomplete relief, and that it is far from clear that one scheme is
intrinsically better than the other.'" He responds to the suggestion that
the schemes ought to be combined in some form by stating there is
"no constitutional duty on the Ontario legislature to do so."33 He essentially
sidesteps the question of which approach is least restrictive by concluding
that the Ontario Sabbatarian exemption "represents a satisfactory effort
on the part of the legislature,"34 and that the courts are not to substitute
judicial opinions for legislative ones "as to the place at which to draw
a precise line."'35
The judgment of La Forest J. in Edwards Books echoes this deference
to legislative decision while reaching different conclusions about the
reasonableness of Sabbatarian exemptions. The learned Justice underlines
the Chief Justice's comment about avoiding "rigid and inflexible stan-
dards," stating that "that seems to me to be essential."36 He goes on
to argue firmly that the legislature must be allowed adequate scope to
achieve pressing objectives, and the courts "must be sensitive to ... the
132 Ibid at 781.
133 Ibid at 782.
134 Ibid
135 Ibid
136 Ibid at 794.
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practical living facts to which a legislature must respond ... especially
... in a field of so many competing pressures as the one here in question."37
He does not, he asserts, mean to infer deference to legislative judgments
where they trench on rights, but only that the courts must recognize
that important goals will often only be achieved to the detriment of
some.38
La Forest J. considers the legislative approaches of other provinces
with respect to Sabbatarian exemptions, but notes that any exemption
threatens the essence of the legislative goal and raises a complicated
array of factors to be considered.139 He states that "the nature of the
choices and the compromises that must be made in relation to Sunday
closing are essentially legislative in nature."14o In conclusion, La Forest
J. holds that the Act would be valid even without an exemption for
Saturday observers, commenting that, indeed, "an exemption may be
subject to constitutional weaknesses" (such as a challenge under section
15 of the Charter).,,"
Despite his observations on section 1, it is not clear that La Forest
J. actually decides the case under the limitations clause. In fact, while
conceding that the economic burden imposed on Saturday observers by
the Act might violate their freedom of religion, he counters that it "would
require evidence to warrant the conclusion that the burden on Saturday-
observing retailers is sufficiently substantial as to constitute an abridge-
ment of their religious freedom.",,2 Such a transfer of the balancing analysis
back into the right is also countenanced by Dickson cJ.C., despite his
determination of the case under section 1. He notes in Edwards that
it is not always necessary to turn to section 1 to justify legislation, agreeing
with Wilson J. in Jones that legislative or administrative action is not
prohibited if it creates a "trivial or insubstantial" burden.1,3
The judgments of both Dickson CJ.c. and La Forest J. in Edwards
Books evidence a clear retreat from the formalism and strictness of the
Oakes test. On the other hand, however, they do not represent a sudden
acceptance by the Court of its political role in deciding Charter questions.
By retreating into a position of deference to legislative decision they
have only avoided the mandate clearly given them by the Constitution.
137 Ibid at 795.
138 Ibid
139 Ibid at 796.
140 Ibid at 806.
11 Ibid at 794.
142 Ibid at 793.
143 Ibid at 759.
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Similarly, the transfer of the balancing process back into the definition
of a right, explicit denials of a policy-making function, and the use of
threshold tests all aid the Supreme Court judiciary in affirming the "legal"
nature of their reasoning and therefore denying the spectre of "politics."
One final form of this avoidance is worthy of comment, and that
is the firm support of formalist analysis put forward by Wilson J. in
all three post-Oakes cases. In Jones, the learned Justice argues for a strict
interpretation of the Oakes test, the corollary to which was the completion
of the analysis under section 2(a) as the legislation could not be justified
under section 1. Wilson J. criticizes the approach of McIntyre J. in Dolphin
Delivery as not being sufficiently "objective," stating that "the search
under section 1 is for the appropriate test to apply."44 It is in Edwards
Books, however, that her formalism becomes most explicit. Wilson J.
rejects the notion of balancing embraced by the other justices by
condemning the "compromise" position taken by the legislature in
designing the section 3(4) exemption in the Retail Business Holidays Act.
She quotes Ronald Dworkin in Law's Empire14s for the assertion that
government must legislate on the basis of principle. Thus, there "must
be compromises about which scheme of justice to adopt rather than a
compromised scheme of justice."146 The application of this principle
requires that the legislature, and then presumably the courts if a con-
stitutional challenge is mounted, choose between the competing goals
of a common pause day and the religious freedom of non-Sunday
observers. Attempts to balance these interests by further references to
the size of the establishment, the number of employees, or the interests
of employers versus those of employees and consumers, are illegitimate
as internal compromises. Wilson J. concludes that the present scheme
of the Act, as it was supported by the other members of the panel,
constitutes a compromised scheme of justice which cannot be upheld
under section 1.
The comments of Madame Justice Wilson are unique only in the
directness with which they refer to a theory of legal reasoning which
purports to provide a formal guideline for judicial decision making. Unlike
many of the other judgments discussed in this paper, where members
of the judiciary seem inevitably to be drawn to the balancing of interests
despite their discomfort with the role, Wilson J. has attempted to draw
a firm line against balancing and choice. It seems unlikely, however,
144 Dolphin Delivey, supra, note 108 at 604.
145 R. Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge Belknop Press of Harvard University, 1986) at
179.
146 Edwards Books, supra, note 107 at 809.
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that this perspective will either garner much support or persevere in the
face of difficult and complex constitutional questions. None of the
mechanisms utilized by the judiciary to avoid the politics of judging
have proved to be very successful in constraining their choices and
determining outcomes in a fashion consistent with their view of their
role. As will be argued further in the next section, we can only hope
that the reality of their role may eventually overcome the formalism
inherent in the judicial treatment of section 1 so far.
VI. CONCLUSION - THE FUTURE OF SECTION 1
Shortly before the Charter of Rights and Freedoms was entrenched
in its final form, L.D. Barry, Q.C., of the Newfoundland bar, penned
an optimistic and enthusiastic prediction for the future of judicial review
under the new document:
Judges ... will be forced to admit they must make choices between competing
values. They will no longer be able to portray themselves as mere mechanical
finders and appliers of the law.... Artificial, question-begging, decision-making
should be reduced with fewer sterile exercises in logical derivation and more contact
with reality.147
Analysis of case law decided under the Charter in the last four years,
however, reveals the survival of what Professor Weiler has called the
"traditional, inarticulate, legal positivism of Canadian lawyers and
judges."48 The problem he identified in his study of the Supreme Court
of Canada in 1974 seems to be true even under the new, expanded
mandate of rights adjudication; the court "exhibits much too narrow a
conception of legal reasoning to do justice to the important legal policies
it is settling for the Canadian polity."149 When one considers the inevitable
moral and political impact of decisions made under the Charter, this
critique becomes even more compelling.
It would be misleading to imply that Canadian courts had played
no significant policy-making role before the enactment of the Charter,,,o
but their new mandate has focused concern on the implications of this
role. In approaching rights adjudication, the chief problem for the courts
is the rather ephemeral sources they are able to use, of which section
1 is a prime example. Its terms are internally contradictory, non-directive,
147 Barry, supra, note 38 at 264.
148 P. Weiler, "Two Models of Judicial Decision-Making" (1968) 46 Can. B. Rev. 406 at
406.
149 Weiler, supra, note 34 at 235.
1SO Russell, supra, note 4 at 2.
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and ambiguous - the description of a political conflict pretending to
be its resolution. Any claim that section 1 comprised a rational decision-
making procedure based on the distinction between law and policy or
law and morality would be difficult to support. The training and
background of the judiciary, however, along with the legal mythology
with which they have been indoctrinated, lead to a great hesitancy in
appealing openly to the values the Charter embodies and a tendency
to rely on formalism to obscure the choices they have been directed
to make. Such obfuscation can be seen in such mechanisms as threshold
tests, emphasis on the definition of a right to the exclusion of section
1 analysis, legislative deference and of course formal "tests" for the
resolution of Charter issues. This has prevented the development of
coherent and consistent approaches, which is reflected in erratic results
in the decided cases. The reasons for Charterjudgments are often difficult
to discern, for the language of the judiciary masks the political and moral
choices they are making behind a rhetoric of legalism.
Such hesitancy to simply recognize the political role courts play
may be rooted in fear for their legitimacy. As non-elected officials they
are considered to be unrepresentative and not politically responsible. Their
suitability is also in question since their particular attributes and expertise
may commend them to formal legal dispute resolution but not to a policy-
making function. This perception undoubtedly leads some analysts to
commend thejudiciary for their cautious approach. Attempts to rationalize
the court's role through denial, however, cannot obscure what that role
undeniably entails. The legislative decision to entrench a rights document
has clearly mandated certain responsibilities to the courts, and in order
to scrutinize, direct, or constrain their choices under it, we are going
to have to acknowledge the nature of these choices.
A look at the drawbacks of the current tendency to mask the judicial
role in policy making leads us to a recognition of the possibilities for
development that have been similarly repressed. If judges are able to
expand the sources they depend upon through improvements in the law
of standing, intervention, and evidence, and perhaps through increased
use of a "policy-science model" of analysis,s we can surely expect some
improvement in the quality of their decision-making. Similarly, the lack
of input to, and ongoing dialogue about, the balancing process in which
the court is engaged might be ameliorated with increased public un-
derstanding of their policy-making capacity. As Professor Russell suggests:
The decisions of Canadian courts interpreting a constitutional charter of rights
and freedoms will provide Canadians with a crash course in judicial policy-making.
151 This approach is suggested by Barry, supra, note 38 at 256.
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Among other things we may learn through this course how to improve the
adjudicative process so that judges can give adequate consideration to all of the
societal facts relevant to deciding whether laws are reasonable. We may also come
to care much more about the representative quality of those who are to do our
judging.152
Key to this type of discussion is a judiciary that is far more honest and
open about the real basis for their decisions despite their desire for
neutrality in the face of controversial political and moral issues. An
acceptance of responsibility for the policy-making function they are
playing should make them more sensitive to the wider impact of their
"legal" decisions and thus more concerned about the quality of their
product. The use of inappropriate judicial values and biases in rights
judgments ought to be reduced. Perhaps more importantly, the possibility
for growth and change in a document that is supposed to be, after all,
"a living tree"53 may be greatly enhanced. The opportunities are plentiful
for the development of a judicial role and a corresponding theory of
law that meet Canada's unique needs.
A constitution embodies a complex set of goals and involves several
different government institutions in their attainment. At times it is tempting
to draw strict boundaries around their respective responsibilities. A nice,
neat model of a legislature that engages in the utilitarian calculus in
order to further majoritarian goals can be set off against a judiciary
that constrains such goals through the protection of individual rights.
A recognition of the interdependency of these two roles, and the
impossibility of distinguishing clearly between their methods may, how-
ever, lead to a more sophisticated and useful paradigm. Many scholars
have suggested that the displacement of certain public policy issues from
the domain of the legislature by constitutional law, along with an emphasis
on fundamental rights theory, indicates a growing distrust of and flight
from politics,1s4 "a deepening disillusionment with the procedures of
representative government and government by discussion as a means
of resolving fundamental questions of political justice."155 It may be,
though, that the Charter represents not "skepticism about the possibility
of public discourse about issues of principle, and ultimately, therefore,
about the possibility of shared, reflectively held public values, 156 but
152 Russell, supra, note 4 at 33.
153 The famous dicta in Edwards v. AG. Canada, [1930] A.C. 124 (P.C.) has been reiterated
in the context of the Charter in Re Southam Inc. and the Queen (No. 1), supra, note 88 at 123.
154 See, for example, Brest, supra, note 30 at 1106-07; T. Sandalow, "The Distrust of Politics"
(1981) 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 446.
155 Russell, supra, note 4 at 32.
156 Brest, supra, note 30 at 1107.
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rather a desire to diversify the opportunities for and methods of such
discourse. An increased recognition by judges, lawyers, and academics
of the political and normative choices inherent in judicial decision making
under the Charter, and especially evident in section 1, can only enhance
these opportunities for growth. It may be that the final outcome of this
"grand constitutional adventure",5, will only be the realization that the
law ".... cannot answer the question of how we are going to live together.
We are going to have to answer that question ourselves.",s8
157 Bayefsky & Cohen, supra, note 2.
158 Singer, supra, note 17 at 59.
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